NATO has been obviously trying to convince the public opinion that this operation, in spite of all, has to go on, although it has been fundamentally erroneous. Yet, we must inevitably put a question, says the British expert, how long?

Jonathan Ayal was particularly impressed by the expression "pilot dropped the bombs in his best intention". What does it look like when he drops bombs in his bad intention?

"This phrase will be remembered even when this war is over, because it very well reflects the dilemma which NATO is facing," emphasizes Ayal in his interview to BBC and adds that a term "democratic pilot" has been used, which is rather unusual when the military officials are in question.

"Politicians have been refusing soldiers' proposals relating to the possible targets, but the fact is that shooting at the Yugoslav army supply roads cannot pass without civilian casualties," concludes the British expert.

That, however, is not the only mistake NATO has been making. As the time is passing, the British experts explains, it becomes more and more clear that "the NATO military strategy cannot result in any sort of political outcome".

He says, it becomes clear now that NATO entered this war entangled in the three assumptions which proved wrong:

-      The Alliance believed that the Yugoslav army would never take a risk to confront the West and that President Milosevic would pull back in the last moment;

-      Secondly, there was an undefined racist conviction that "small peoples" in the Balkans cannot match the air power of the NATO: we will drop a couple of bombs to those "natives" in Yugoslavia and they will soon beg for peace;

-      Finally, NATO was addressing the public at the two fronts at the same time: threatening Belgrade with air strikes, and at the same time commanders of the Alliance have been assuring the public opinion in the West that their operation would be "surgically accurate" and restricted in size.

"The result was that the Yugoslav President knew from the very beginning the risk he was taking and concluded it was worth taking it."

In the last two weeks, actually, we have been the witnesses of the mess which NATO created and which they have been trying to extricate, estimates the British expert.

NATO's plan for the air strikes looked good on the paper, but in principle it was irrelevant. Contrary to the calculations of the western planners, Belgrade did not activate its air defence system, depriving NATO the chance to shoot at radar and missile installations.

The planned three stages of the air strikes quickly fused into one: the strategy conceived to enable careful escalation of the pressure on Yugoslavia aiming at reaching the solution, became the goal for itself. In this process, the list of targets has widened, and the difference between civilian and military targets was fading away, stresses Ayal.

The western politicians have been trying in the meantime, to adapt their political goals to this change of targets. The operation was at first justified as an attempt to hinder the humanitarian catastrophe, says Ayal. When the real humanitarian catastrophe actually happened, emphasizes Jonathan Ayal, because of such NATO's strategy, NATO was acting surprise (in spite of the fact that all military intelligence services had anticipated such an outcome months ago) and took commitment to return the Albanian refugees to their homes.

In other words, the goal of the operation changed from hindering humanitarian catastrophe into elimination of its consequences. The Alliance adhered to the initial peace plan, offered at the beginning of this year, although the situation on the ground changed.

So the West got stuck somewhere in the middle, and by all means, got stuck in the Balkans' mud. First they wanted to hinder the humanitarian catastrophe, and when they saw they made it themselves, they now say they are trying to save the refugees, says Ayal.

"At one moment they regret Milosevic is expelling his own people, then they are worried Milosevic is hindering departure of refugees". And the British military expert ironically notices, all this happened two weeks after launching "accurate and surgically efficient" air operation.

Yet, the war fog will raise soon, says Ayal, because the confrontation is transferred once again onto a diplomatic field. However, one thing still remains unclear: what is it exactly that NATO wants?

The simple answer is that NATO has no response; much depends on the moment when the offer is presented, but also on the appearance of the package.

In any case, doubts on the efficiency of air strikes remain, and NATO will not be able to avoid the debate in the UN Security Council about its mandate for this operation.

According to the words of NATO representative, on which Ayal refers, the minimum demands remain the key element - Yugoslav consent for the arrival of NATO troops on its territory. However, NATO is not even close to it, whereas Belgrade has attained its first direct objectives.

In this moment, NATO continues its operations with undiminished force, but the western governments know it is not a long-term solution, estimates Ayal. Soon, the public will reinforce in pressure to send humanitarian activists there to render indispensable aid. Therefore, whatever we do, in the next couple of days we will witness the creation of a completely different situation in which NATO will decide, either it will get involved in a total war against the Yugoslav state, or will tacitly accept to be check-mated by Belgrade, thinks Ayal.

All the wars start with clear intentions, carefully planned strategies and broad public backup, but at the end, they have a different outcome, concludes Director of the Research Department of the Royal Military Institute in London, Jonathan Ayal.